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Neither the EU nor the UK should be under any illusions about the
outcome of this election: talking trade, security and wider global
politics with President Biden is going to be difficult, writes Tim
Oliver (Loughborough London). The one consolation is that it will be
difficult in ways that British and European leaders, diplomats and
officials will find less nauseating.
President Trump’s has shown nothing more than a mediocre understanding of the UK
and European politics, Brexit, or the ideas of Boris Johnson and other European
leaders. As a case in point, the substantive benefits for Johnson of his relationship with
Trump have been minimal. Trump liked Johnson almost entirely because he saw in him
a gratifying reflection of his own politics. It’s meant that as with so many other
countries and world leaders, the UK and Boris Johnson have struggled to deal with an
administration that lacked anything resembling a strategy because the focus was on a
President who has operated largely by impulse.
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That does not mean Biden’s strategy will make life easy. The UK needs to remember
that the ‘Special Relationship’ only goes so far. The core of the relationship remains
intelligence, special forces and nuclear weapons. The US and UK trust each other in
those three areas far more than they trust anyone else, largely thanks to long-standing
and very close working relations between civil servants and military personnel. That
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core has long been protected from the vagaries of presidential and prime ministerial
relations or other tensions. That remains the case despite the past four years. While
there are also strong economic links, such as between London and New York’s financial
industries, there are, as an advisor to a US Senator made clear to me many years ago,
‘no special relationships in international trade.’
For a US President, and more importantly the US Congress (whoever controls the
Senate or House), the special relationship they naturally care about most is that with
American businesses and consumers. When you add to this that in international trade
size matters a lot, there can be little doubt that US businesses and consumers will come
out on top in any trade negotiations with the UK. Negotiating with the Biden
Administration will, therefore, be another step along the steep learning curve about the
realities of trade deals that Britain has been on since 2016.
The EU’s economic size does not mean it can expect an easy ride. It is, along with the
USA, the world’s other economic and regulatory superpower (with China fast catching
up). Their comparable size makes it difficult for either side to prevail on purely
economic or regulatory grounds (even if the EU leads more on the latter). A US
president, however, has the edge because the USA can call on the full spectrum of hard
and soft powers. The USA can shape (or at least try to) the global economy, norms and
institutions in ways the EU remains incapable of doing.
That does not mean the EU, or the UK, always have to work with the USA. A second
Trump presidency would have seen both the EU and the UK try to find ways around US
opposition to global cooperation on the environment or trade. Those efforts would have
been far more difficult and likely to fail. Being able to at least work with rather than
around the USA will make a Biden Administration more palatable. It means, however,
that Europeans, Brits included, will spend the next four years looking to the USA for
global leadership and agonising over who the next occupant of the White House will be
in 2024.
This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of LSE Brexit, nor of the
London School of Economics.
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